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‘Steel  my  soldiers’  hearts’:  El  Alamein  Reappraised.1 
 
 
Jonathan Fennell 
 
 
The   Oxford   Bodleian   Library   holds   293   titles   under   the   subject   of   the   ‘North  
African Campaign of the Second World  War’,  the  British  Library  308.2 That amounts to 
over four books a year on the subject, or about one book published every three months, 
for the sixty-nine years since November 1942. This constitutes a remarkable body of 
scholarship on what historians today might refer to as a secondary theatre in the Second 
World War.3 
There are a number of possible reasons for this level of interest in the North 
African campaign. Firstly, North Africa is where British and Commonwealth forces 
learnt how to defeat the Wehrmacht. It had taken three long years before Britain and her 
allies celebrated their first decisive victory on land against Germany, at El Alamein, in 
November 1942. In many ways, the dynamics of the critical campaign in North West 
Europe, between 1944 and 1945, cannot be understood without first understanding the 
processes that led to victory in North Africa. Secondly, in a global conflict often 
characterised by brutality, North Africa represents an oasis of chivalry and sanity, an 
environment where, in the main, war was contained away from innocent civilians. 
                                                             
1 The title of this paper is from the speech of King Henry before the battle of Agincourt (Henry V, Act IV, 
Scene  I,  line  289),  ‘O  God  of  battles!  Steel  my  soldiers’  hearts’.  Montgomery  pinned  the  quotation  to  the  
wall of his caravan before the battle of El Alamein. 
2 See www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk and www.explore.bl.uk.  
3 For   instance  Evan  Mawdsley’s  World War II: A New History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) devotes only 12 out of 452 pages to North Africa. 
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North Africa is different because it is uncomplicated by ideology and extermination. 
Finally, North Africa is interesting because the reasons for Allied success are 
controversial and still debatable. After close to seventy years of scholarship, the causes 
of  Eighth  Army’s  success  at  El  Alamein  are  still  contested. 
Perhaps  the  most  dominant  explanation  for  Eighth  Army’s  victory  centres  on  the  
role that the commanders played; there are 55 titles on Field Marshal Sir Bernard 
Montgomery, 9 on Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck and 58 on Field Marshal Erwin 
Rommel in the Bodleian library.4 Many  works  argue  that  Montgomery’s  military  nous  
made the decisive difference to the campaign, as he was able to defeat the Panzerarmee 
Afrika at Alam Halfa and El Alamein with much the same force as Auchinleck had 
utilised during the disastrous summer months of 1942.5 In the late 1950s and 1960s, 
however, a number of books were published that painted a very different picture of the 
events   that   had   unfolded   in   the   second   half   of   1942.   John   Connell’s   biography   of  
Auchinleck  and  Corelli  Barnett’s  The Desert Generals sought, in particular, to reinstate 
Auchinleck’s   reputation   and   query   Montgomery’s   image   as   the   ‘messiah’   of Eighth 
Army.6 More recently, histories such as Raising   Churchill’s   Army by David French, 
Pendulum of War by Niall Barr, Alamein, The Australian Story by Mark Johnston and Peter 
Stanley and Rommel’s   Desert   War by Martin Kitchen have offered a more balanced 
approach to the Montgomery/Auchinleck debate.7 These works, based on a more 
                                                             
4 See www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk. 
5 B.L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery of Alamein (London: Pen & Sword, 1958); 
Brian Horrocks, A Full Life (Collins: London, 1960); Major-General F. de Guingand, Operation Victory 
(London:  C.  Scribner’s  Sons,  1947);  Field  Marshal  Earl  Alexander  of  Tunis,  The Alexander Memoirs, 1940-
1945 (London:  Cassell, 1962); Nigel Hamilton, The Full Monty: Montgomery of Alamein 1887-1942 (London: 
Penguin Books, 2002). 
6 John Connell, Auchinleck: A Biography of Field-Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck (London: Cassell, 1959); 
Corelli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London: Viking Press, 1960); C.E. Lucas Phillips, Alamein (London: 
Heinemann, 1962); Michael Carver, El Alamein (London: Macmillan, 1962); Michael Carver, Tobruk 
(London: B. T. Batsford LTD., 1964). 
7 David French, Raising  Churchill’s  Army:  The  British  Army  and  the  War  against  Germany  1919-1945 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 2004); Mark Johnston and Peter Stanley, Alamein: The Australian Story (Oxford: OUP 
Australia and New Zealand, 2002); Martin Kitchen, Rommel’s  Desert  War:  Waging  World  War   II in North 
Africa, 1941-1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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thorough investigation of the primary sources, have stressed the contribution of both 
Auchinleck and Montgomery to victory at El Alamein. 
The other dominant explanation for Allied success in North Africa focuses on the 
role played by materiel in the campaign. Literature on North Africa is replete with 
references to the quantitative disadvantages suffered by Germany and Italy in 
comparison to their enemies in the desert.8 The unbending logic of numbers and 
economics, as many argue, made it impossible for the Axis forces to win a campaign 
against the combined strength of the arms of the British Empire and the economy of the 
future superpower, the United States. The British Official History of the North African 
campaign expounds in great detail on the significance of the amount, and quality, of 
materiel available to Eighth Army.9 The Afrika   Korps’ war diaries claimed that the 
‘heroic  troops’  of  the  Panzerarmee ‘were  denied  victory  .  .  . due to enemy superiority in 
numbers   and  material,   and   not   in   leadership   and  morale.’10 Walter Warlimont, who 
served   as  Hitler’s  Deputy   Chief   of   the  Operations   Staff   between   September   1939   and  
September   1944,   described   El   Alamein   as   “a   typical   battle   of   material in which no 
military genius on the part of the commander, and no amount of courage on the part of 
the men, could make up for the catastrophic situation brought about by the failure of 
                                                             
8 See for example, John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (London: 
Viking, 1990); John Keegan, The Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1997); Richard Overy, Why the Allies 
Won (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995); Barr, Pendulum of War; Barrie Pitt, The   Crucible   of   War:   Wavell’s  
Command (London: Cassell, 2001); Barrie Pitt, The  Crucible  of  War:  Auchinleck’s  Command  (London: Cassell, 
2001); Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War: Montgomery and Alamein (London: Cassell, 2001); Shelford Bidwell 
and Dominick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945 (London: 
HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 1982); Stephen Bungay, Alamein (London: Aurum Press, 2002); Jon 
Latimer, Alamein (London: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
9 I.S.O. Playfair, et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume I: The Early Success against Italy (London, 
1954); I.S.O. Playfair, et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume II: The Germans Come to the Help of 
their Ally (London: HMSO, 1956); I.S.O. Playfair, et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume III: British 
Fortunes Reach their Lowest Ebb (London: HMSO, 1956); I.S.O Playfair and C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean 
and Middle East, Volume IV. The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa (London: HMSO, 1966). 
10 South African Military Archives Depot (SAMAD) Union War Histories (UWH), Draft Narratives, Box 
316. 15th Panzer Division Report on the Battle of Alamein and the Retreat to Marsa El Brega, 23 October to 
20 November, 1942. 
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the  [Axis]  overseas  supply   lines.”11 Nevertheless, Montgomery in his memoirs made it 
clear that he saw materiel as an adjunct to the much more important human dimension 
at El Alamein.12 He  believed   that  battles  were  “won  primarily   in   the  hearts  of  men.”13 
He dissented from the view that the outcome at El Alamein had been determined by 
Eighth  Army’s  numerical  and  technological  advantages.14  
Another issue, morale, has taken a back seat to these explanations in the 
historiography of the desert war. This is in spite of the fact that in their memoirs, many 
of the Generals involved, including Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, 
Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand and Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks, 
stressed, among other things, the significance of a morale crisis that severely hampered 
Eighth   Army’s   combat   performance in the summer months of 1942. These memoirs 
hailed  Montgomery’s  arrival  in  August  1942  as  the  catalyst  for  a  revival  of  morale  that  
greatly facilitated the victories at Alam Halfa and El Alamein in September, October 
and November 1942.15 This viewpoint has been broadly supported by authors such as 
Michael Carver and Nigel Hamilton who argued that Eighth Army fought with less élan 
and determination at Gazala than in later battles such as El Alamein.16 Barr, and 
Johnston and Stanley have also acknowledged that there were morale difficulties in the 
British Army during the North African Campaign.17 
Barnett and Connell, however, downplayed the idea that there was a morale 
crisis  in  the  summer  of  1942.  Barnett  argued  that  “it  would  be  wrong  to  place  too  much  
emphasis on the moral effects produced by [Montgomery]: for in the words of the 
Official   History,   Auchinleck   ‘had   retained   to   a   remarkable   degree   [his   army’s]  
                                                             
11 Walter   Warlimont,   ‘The   Decision   in   the   Mediterranean   1942’   in   Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jürgen 
Rohwer (eds.), The Decisive Battles of World War II: The German View (London: Putnam Pub Group, 1965), 
p. 203.  
12 Imperial War Museum (IWM) Bernard Law Montgomery Papers (BLM) 24/1 5 Corps Study Week for 
Commanders. Some Lessons Learnt During the First Year of War, September 1939 to September 1940; 
BLM  28/3  ‘Lightfoot’  General Plan of Eighth Army, 14 September 1942.  
13 Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein, p. 89. 
14 Ibid., p. 83. 
15 Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery of Alamein; Horrocks, A Full Life; de Guingand, 
Operation Victory; Alexander, The Alexander Memoirs. 
16 Carver, Tobruk, p. 262; Hamilton, The Full Monty, p. 529.  
17 Barr, Pendulum of War; Johnston and Stanley, Alamein. 
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admiration  and  confidence.’”18 Other historians have expressed similar viewpoints. Jon 
Latimer, in Alamein,   said   that   morale   problems   in   Eighth   Army   were   a   “legend”.19 
Desmond Young, in his biography of Rommel, also described the contention that there 
was  a  morale   crisis   as   “legend”.   Such  arguments,  he   said,  were   “unfair   to   the  Eighth  
Army”  and  also  “contrary  to  the  facts.”20 Martin  Kitchen  described  it  as  “pure  myth”.21 
French  has  similarly  said  that  too  much  has  been  made  “of  the  apparently  poor  morale  
of  the  British  army.”  The  problem,  he  has  argued,  is  that  historians  have  too  often  been  
“willing   to   generalize about poor morale from an excessively narrow range of 
evidence.”22  
. . . . . . . . 
This paper directly addresses the issue of the morale of Eighth Army during the 
critical months of fighting in 1942. It makes the case that there was a morale crisis in the 
summer  of  1942  and  that  it  severely  affected  Eighth  Army’s  performance.  It  argues  that  
this crisis was turned around in dramatic fashion in the run up to the battle of El 
Alamein and that this turnaround played a decisive role in influencing the outcome of 
that battle. It also proposes a reconsideration of the roles of leadership and materiel in 
victory at El Alamein in light of the findings presented. 
Morale can be defined as the willingness of an individual or group to prepare for 
and engage in an action required by an authority or institution; this willingness can be 
engendered by a positive desire for action and/or by the discipline to accept orders to 
take such action. The degree of morale of an individual or army, therefore, relates to the 
extent of their desire or discipline to act, or their determination to see an action 
through.23 
This definition clarifies what is meant by morale in the context of this paper and 
raises two further questions. What was the institutionally desired action demanded of 
                                                             
18 Barnett, The Desert Generals, p. 258. 
19 Latimer, Alamein, pp. 97-8. 
20 Desmond Young, Rommel (London: Collins, 1950), p. 162. 
21 Kitchen, Rommel’s  Desert  War, p. 287. 
22 French, Raising  Churchill’s  Army, p. 122. 
23 Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El 
Alamein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 9. 
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Eighth Army in the desert, and, did Eighth Army demonstrate willingness (engendered 
by desire and/or discipline) to act in this fashion?  
The answer to the first of these questions appears simple enough. Eighth Army 
was expected to fight, and not expected to surrender, desert or demonstrate 
unwillingness to fight through e.g. unwarranted levels of sickness or breakdown. But, 
the degree of this expectation is worth noting; British army regulations stipulated that 
every soldier in the army was required to fight even when the situation appeared 
hopeless or the soldier might realistically expect to die or suffer wounds as a result. 
Even in such circumstances, the military still deemed it inexcusable to surrender or 
desert. The 1929 Field Service Regulations   (FSR)   explained   that   “there   is   only   one  
degree of resistance for troops . . . that is to the last round and the last man, unless 
definite  orders  to  the  contrary  are  received  by  the  commander  of  those  troops.”24 There 
is no evidence to suggest that the commanders in the desert considered their troops 
exempt from the requirements as set out in the FSR. 
The answer to the second question, a problem historians have traditionally 
avoided,25 is more complex. Firstly, the testimony of those who fought in the desert can 
provide a valuable source on combatant morale. However, as David French has argued, 
historians often rely on too few accounts to paint a reliable picture.26 The approach used 
here attempts to overcome this problem by utilizing sources on morale that are based 
on widespread sampling of the mail of the combatants. During the campaign about one 
letter in every thirteen or fourteen sent by the soldiers was examined by the army 
censorship authorities. These letters were then summarised into reports describing in 
detail the state of morale of the constituent parts and nationalities of Middle East 
Command, as well as the causes of good or bad morale.27 The summaries that deal with 
Australian morale have been used by Mark Johnston and Peter Stanley in their works 
on the Australian experience during the Second World War. The New Zealand Official 
Histories and John McLeod, in Myth and Reality: The New Zealand Soldier in World War II, 
                                                             
24 War Office, Field Service Regulations (FSR) Chap. VII Sec. 77 (1929). 
25 Hew  Strachan,  ‘The  Soldier’s  Experience  in  Two  World  Wars:  Some  Historiographical  Comparisons’,  in  
Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds.), Time  to  Kill:  The  Soldier’s  Experience of War in the West, 1939-1945 
(London: Pimlico, 1997), p. 369. 
26 French, Raising  Churchill’s  Army, p. 122. 
27 Australian War Memorial (AWM) 54 883/2/97 Middle East Field Censorship Weekly Summary 
(MEFCWS), No. I (12 to 18 Nov 1941), p. 1.  
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used the summaries referring to New Zealand morale.28 The summaries referring to 
British and South African morale, as far as the author is aware, have only been used in 
his own study, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the 
Path to El Alamein. 
These sources clearly suggest that there was a morale problem in the desert 
during the summer months of 1942 and that this problem was resolved in the weeks 
preceding El Alamein. The extent of the crisis is made all the more striking by the fact  
that the censorship summaries had reported the morale of most of the units in the 
desert  to  be  “exceedingly  high”  in  March  1942.29 Subsequently, the censorship summary 
for the period covering the fall of Tobruk and the retreat from the Gazala line, in June 
1942,  reported  that  “the  high  morale  of  the  troops  had  suffered  a  set  back.”30 By the start 
of  July,  the  censorship  summaries  stated  that  “the  withdrawal  into  Egypt  has  provoked  
expressions of very bitter disappointment from all ranks of the Eighth Army, 
accompanied  by  admissions  of  weariness  and  fatigue.”31 The censorship summary for 
the   period   8   to   14   July   commented   that   “some   officers   .   .   .   were   rather   concerned  
regarding  the  spiritless  attitude  of  some  of  the  troops.”32 By the end of July the censors 
were reporting   that   “many   of   the   troops   are   beginning   to   lose   interest   in   the  war,   to  
some   in   fact   the   reason   for   the   war   itself   has   become   dimmed.”33 The censorship 
summary   for   the   period   5   to   11   August,   stated   that   the   soldiers’   mail   had   shown   a  
“spate   of   grouses and an increase in the number of writers who stated they were 
‘browned   off’   .   .   .   there  were   little   or   no   traces   of   the   offensive   spirit,   and   an   almost  
                                                             
28 Mark Johnston, At the Front Line: Experiences of Australian Soldiers in World War II (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Mark Johnston, Australian Soldiers and their Adversaries in World War II 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Johnston and Stanley, Alamein; J. L. Scoullar, Battle for 
Egypt: The Summer of 1942. Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-1945 (Wellington: 
War History Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, 1955); John McLeod, Myth and Reality: The New Zealand 
Soldier in World War II (Auckland: reed Methuen, 1986). 
29 AWM 54 883/2/97 MEFCWS, No. XX (25 to 31 March 1942), p. 1. 
30 Archives New Zealand (ANZ) WAII/1/DA/508/1 Vol. 1 MEFCWS, No. XXXII (17 to 23 June 1942), p. 1. 
31 ANZ WAII/1/DA/508/1 Vol. 1 Middle East Military Censorship Weekly Summary (MEMCWS), No. 
XXXIV (1 to 7 July 1942), p. 1. 
32 ANZ WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol. 1 MEFCWS, No. XXXV (8 to 14 July 1942), p. 7. 
33 ANZ WAII/1/DA/508/1 Vol. 1 MEMCWS, No. XXXVIII (29 July to 4 August 1942), p. 2. 
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complete absence of any reference to forcing the enemy to give up the ground gained in 
the last two months.”34  
By comparison, the censorship summary for 19 to 25 August, the period 
following  Montgomery’s  accession  to  command  on  13  August,  reported  that  “a  breath  
of fresh, invigorating air has swept through British Troops in Egypt, and the mail has 
altered in tone almost overnight. Renewed optimism and confidence were everywhere 
apparent,  and  the  old  aggressive  spirit   .   .   .   is   in  the  process  of  being  recovered.”35 The 
summary  for  the  Battle  of  El  Alamein  in  October  1942  stated  categorically  that  “on  the  
evidence  of  this  mail  no  army  ever  went  to  battle  with  higher  morale.”36 
A  second  way  to  assess  an  army’s  willingness  to  act  in  an  institutionally  required  
fashion is to analyse the factors that military professionals identify as good indicators or 
corollaries of morale. For example, high rates of desertion, surrender, sickness and 
battle exhaustion can suggest that morale is low in a military organisation; low rates can 
indicate high levels of morale.37  
By the end of July 1942, medical personnel in the desert were reporting a 
dramatic  and  “most  disquieting”  increase  in  the  sickness  rate  in  the  Middle  East.38 The 
daily sickness rate had risen from 1.4 men per thousand in March (a monthly rate of 
43.4   per   thousand),   before   Rommel’s   successful   offensive   at   Gazala, to 2.39 per 
thousand in July (a monthly rate of 74.1 per thousand). It rose further again to 2.42 per 
thousand in August 1942 (a monthly rate of 75 per thousand).39 That is a 73 percent 
increase  from  the  beginning  to  the  climax  of  Rommel’s  offensive.  Although the increase 
could certainly be blamed to some extent on the effects of the African summer and the 
hordes of flies that accompanied it, the rise is still remarkable. 
The incidence of NYD(N) (Not Yet Diagnosed (Nervous)), or battle exhaustion, 
also proved disturbingly high. Men suffering from NYD(N) exhibited what 
                                                             
34 ANZ WAII/1/DA/508/1 Vol. 1 MEMCWS, No. XXXIX (5 to 11 August 1942), p. 1. 
35 ANZ WAII/1/DA/508/1 Vol. 3 MEMCWS, No. XLI (19 to 25 August 1942), p. 1 
36 National Archives (NA) War Office (WO) 193/453 Morale Report, August to October, 1942. 
37 NA Cabinet Papers (CAB) 21/914, The Work of Army Psychiatrists in Relation to Morale, January 1944; 
Major General F.M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological Factors in War (London: Cooper, 
1978); IWM BLM 49 Montgomery to Alan Brooke, 15 April 1943, p. 3. 
38 NA WO 177/324 Medical Situation Report, 24 July 1942. 
39 NA WO 177/324 Monthly Report on Health Eighth Army, March, July, August 1942. 
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“psychiatrists   described   as   acute   fear   reactions   and   acute   and   chronic   anxiety  
manifested through uncontrollable tremors, a pronounced startle reaction to war-
related sounds and a profound loss of self-confidence.”40 On 28 July 1942, Brigadier 
G.W.B. James, the Consultant Psychiatrist Eighth Army, reported that 
NYD(N)/Exhaustion cases were forming 7 to 10 percent of the total sick and battle 
casualties on the El Alamein line.41 The situation had become so serious, according to 
Major H.B. Craigie, of the Department of Army Psychiatry in the Middle East that, by 
mid-1942, the three hospitals for mental cases in the Middle East were together holding 
nearly 1,400 patients; they had been designed to take under 1,000 cases in total.42  
For example, the 2nd New Zealand Division had 489 cases of NYD(N) admitted to 
hospital in the two months of fighting between July and August 1942. This was 
equivalent to the fighting part of one whole infantry battalion.43 They suffered 16 
NYD(N) casualties per 100 battle casualties in July, rising to 28 such cases per 100 battle 
casualties in August 1942.44 Rates of NYD(N) were equally high for the South Africans. 
A  report,  written  on  8  August  1942,  stated  that  South  African  morale  was  “defective  in  
that   there   is  a   large  wastage  of  manpower  owing   to  neurotic   illness”,  and  the  various  
ways   in  which  men   got   “themselves out of the fighting line, due to a loss of will to 
fight.”45 The 1st South African Division suffered a rate of 12.2 cases of NYD(N) per one 
                                                             
40 Psychiatrists  began  to  refer  to  NYD(N)  as  ‘battle  exhaustion’  later  in  the  war.  Terry  Copp,  ‘If  this  war  
isn’t  over,  And  pretty  damn soon,  There’ll  be  nobody  left,  In  this  old  platoon…’:  First  Canadian  Army,  
February – March  1945’,  in  Addison  and  Calder  (eds.),  Time to Kill, p. 149. 
41 NA  WO  177/324  Memorandum  ‘Sickness,  Army  Troops’,  by  Deputy  Director  Medical  Services.  Eighth  
Army, 26 July 1942; Report on Tour of Eighth Army, 18 to 24 July, 1942 by Consultant in Psychological 
Medicine (Brig. G.W.B. James), 28 July 1942. For a fuller analysis of these figures and the debate which 
surrounds them please see Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, pp. 28-34. 
42 NA CAB 21/914 Expert Committee on the Work of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the Services, Note 
by Major H.B. Craigie of the Department of Army Psychiatry in the Middle East to Sir Stafford Cripps 
(Lord Privy Seal) on Psychiatric Cases in the Middle East, 21 July 1942. 
43 IWM TM 30-410 Technical Manual, Handbook on the British Army with Supplements on the Royal Air Force 
and Civilian Defence Organizations (Washington: Naval and Military Press, 1943), p. 25. 
44 ANZ WAII/8/Part 2/BBB Freyberg Papers, Morale. 
45 SAMAD Divisional Documents (Div Docs), Gp 1 Box 1, Memorandum on Morale of SA Troops in the 
Middle East, 8 August 1942, p. 9. 
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hundred battle casualties in the three months from April to June 1942,46 but suffered a 
rate of up to 25 per hundred battle casualties in July 1942.47 
The high incidence of NYD(N)/Exhaustion among armoured formations also 
caused   concern.   A   report   on   ‘Casualties   in   Armoured   Fighting   Vehicles,’   released   in  
July 1942, pointed out that the number of exhaustion cases admitted to hospital from 
armoured  units  was  “between  three  and  four  times  the  normal  rate”  in  June  1942.    The  
report  stated  that  “while  the  number  of  cases  in  the  R.A.  [Royal  Artillery]  and  infantry”  
had   approximately   “doubled   in   June,”   the   incidence   in   the armoured formation had 
grown at a much higher rate.48  
The July and August figures quoted for the New Zealand and South African 
divisions are higher than the average figures for all combatants and all theatres in the 
Second World War (around 12.5 percent).49 They also compare unfavourably with the 
other campaigns in the desert. The campaign against the Italians (December 1940-March 
1941) produced less than 200 psychological cases for all services (around 10 percent of 
battle casualties).50 During 1941, James reported that one in every six battle casualties 
(16.66 percent) was psychiatric.51 As serious as these figures appear, they only represent 
less than 7 percent of the total number of combat neurosis cases recorded (c. 9,000 cases) 
by Middle East Command in 1942.52 The majority of cases would have occurred among 
the  British   troops   that  made   up  between   forty   and   seventy  percent  of  Eighth  Army’s  
fighting units at different stages of 1942.53 Nine thousand troops amounts to over half of 
                                                             
46 SAMAD Div Docs Gp 1 Box 6, Operations Reports and Lessons, April to July 1942, Work Done by 
Medical Services During the Quarter Ending on 30 June 1942. 
47 Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, p.33. 
48 NA WO 222/65 Report on Casualties in Armoured Fighting Vehicles, Medical Research Section, GHQ, 
MEF, 20 July 1942; NA WO 177/127 Report of Factors Affecting Efficiency of Tank Crews, Medical 
Research Section, GHQ, MEF, 2 July 1942. 
49 John Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II (London: Compendium Publishing, 1990), p. 
246. 
50 F. Crew (ed.), History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Medical Services – Army Medical Services, 
Vol. 1 Campaigns (London: HMSO, 1957), p. 464. 
51 Crew, History of the Second World War, Table J, p. 491. 
52 Mark Harrison, Medicine and Victory: British Military Medicine in the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 122. 
53 NA WO 163/51 The Army Council, Death Penalty in Relation to Offences Committed on Active Service, 
11 August 1942; NA WO 201/444 Total Daily Strength and Casualties as at 0600 HRS, 5 November 1942, 
Libya Period 6 – No. 13. 
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the establishment of a full infantry division54 and represents more than 133% of the 
fighting portion of a front line infantry division.55 
Desertion and absenteeism rates can also be regarded as good indicators of unit 
morale.56 In 1942, the situation in the Middle East as regards desertion became so 
serious that the Commander-in-Chief, Claude Auchinleck, with the unanimous 
agreement of his Army Commanders, forwarded to the War Office a recommendation 
for the reintroduction of the death penalty for “desertion   in   the   field”   and   for  
“misbehaving   in   the   face   of   the   enemy   in   such   a   manner   as   to   show   cowardice”.57 
Auchinleck first raised the issue in April 1942, after the disappointment of the German 
counter offensive in early February.58 Following the fall of Tobruk and the retreat from 
the Gazala line, he once again cabled London demanding the return of the death 
penalty. He reported that 63 absentees had been apprehended at Matruh in a single day 
during the Knightsbridge fighting along the Gazala line in June 1942. During the 27 
days of battle ending 13 July 1942, 907 absentees had been reported to the Corps of 
Military Police of whom 430 were subsequently apprehended. The total number of 
unapprehended British and Commonwealth absentees was still 1,728 at the time of his 
writing to the War Office.59 Other statistics for courts martial convictions in British 
overseas commands in 1941 and 1942 show that there was a peak during August 1942, a 
time when there was no major action other than that taking place in the desert. 
 
 
                                                             
54 IWM TM 30-410 Handbook on the British Army, p. 24. 
55 Bungay, Alamein, pp. 198-9. 
56 NA CAB 21/914 The Work of Army Psychiatrists in Relation to Morale, January 1944; Shelford Bidwell, 
Modern Warfare: A Study of Men, Weapons and Theories (London: Allen Lane, 1973), p. 129. 
57 NA  WO   32/15773   ‘Death   Penalty   for  Offences  Committed   on  Active   Service’,  Memorandum  by   the  
Secretary of State for War (P.J. Grigg), 12 June 1942; Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African 
Campaign, pp. 34-46. 
58 NA WO 32/15773 Auchinleck to the Under Secretary of State, the War Office, 7 April 1942. 
59 NA WO 32/15773 C-in-C Middle East to the War Office, 24 July 1942. 
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Figure One: Courts Martial Convictions for Absence and Desertion Overseas 
Commands, 1941-42.60 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
60 Chart  derived  from  NA  WO  277/7  Comparative  Chart  of  ‘Absence’  and  ‘Desertion’  Home  Forces and 
Overseas Commands from 1 September 1939 to 31 August 1945. 
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A further indicator of morale problems in the Eighth Army, and perhaps the 
most striking in representing a possible failure of its will to fight, was the surrender 
rate. In July 1942, Auchinleck presented figures to the War Office, showing an alarming 
ratio  of  “missing”  to  overall  casualties.  Between  the  beginning  of  Rommel’s  offensive  at  
the end of May and late July, Eighth Army lost 1,700 killed and 6,000 wounded, but had 
57,000 categorized   as   missing,   “of   whom   the   great   majority   must   be   assumed   to   be  
prisoners   of  war.”61 These figures equate to a missing/surrendered rate of around 88 
percent of casualties during the summer fighting and tally with other figures sent to the 
War Office in August 1942.62 The statistics can be broken down further. Around 82 to 86 
percent of British casualties were classified as missing/surrendered during the Gazala, 
Tobruk and July battles. The Australian missing/surrendered rate was about 34 percent, 
that of the New Zealanders was 42 percent while the South African and Indian rate was 
90 percent.63 The total number of POW and missing soldiers reported by the British 
Army during the Second World War amounted to 185,847; this was 32.6 percent of total 
casualties. The statistics from the desert in the summer of 1942 were clearly out of line 
with the general picture and must be understood in that light.64  
Both General Sir Ronald Adam, the Adjutant General, and Sir P.J. Grigg, the 
Secretary of State for War, suggested that the high rates of missing/surrendered showed 
that   the   British   soldier   was   “inclined   to   surrender   rather   than   to   fight   it   out,”   and  
therefore agreed to re-open the death penalty issue as demanded by Auchinleck.65 The 
Army Council similarly concluded   that   “the   capitulation   at   Singapore,   the   fall   of  
Tobruk and the large proportion of unwounded prisoners in the operations in 
                                                             
61 NA WO 32/15773 The Army Council, Death Penalty in Relation to Offences Committed on Active Duty, 
31 July 1942, p. 1. 
62 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), Adam Papers, Box 2, Notes on A.C.S. Paper 
Comparison of Casualties, Libya, AG Stats, 6 August 1942; NA WO 163/51 The Army Council, Death 
Penalty in Relation to Offences Committed on Active Service, 11 August 1942. 
63 NA WO 32/10810 Battle Casualties (Exclusive of Deaths from Natural Causes) Incurred by Forces 
Under  British  Empire  Control  as  Reported  by  “Hot  Spot”  cables  from  3  September  1939  to  28  June  1946. 
64 LHCMA, Adam Papers, Box 2, White Paper, Strengths and Casualties of the Armed Forces and 
Auxiliary Services of the United  Kingdom  1939  to  1945  (London,  His  Majesty’s  Stationery  Office),  p.8.   
65 NA WO 163/89 Executive Committee of the Army Council, The Death Penalty for Offences Committed 
on Active Service, 21 July 1942. 
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Cyrenaica [the Western Desert], are pointers to a condition existing in the Army which 
does not appear to accord with its old traditions.”66  
Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead, the commander of 9th Australian 
Division, certainly thought that morale had played a part in causing the problem. He 
wrote to his men on 10 October 1942 admonishing them. 
In the war there have been far too many unwounded prisoners taken. The 
modern   term   ‘in   the  bag’   is   too  excusable,   it   is  not  harsh  enough,  and   it  
seems to mitigate having failed to make a proper stand and even to 
having just merely surrendered. We must make it unfashionable. I have 
closely questioned escaped prisoners and I know what actually happened 
in some instances, I am sure that those who did not put up a fight must 
often ruminate over it in their prison camps especially in the winter 
months. 
You must impress on your officers, NCOs and men that when they are cut 
off or surrounded and there appears no hope of survival they must 
organise themselves into a defensive locality and hold out. They must be a 
good staunch Australian and not emulate the Italians. By so doing they 
will add enormously  to  the  enemy’s  difficulties  and  will  assist  materially  
the development of our own operations. And they will live to have pride 
and satisfaction in themselves instead of spending the rest of the war and 
a long time afterwards in prison camps. Nothing is ever hopeless so long 
as troops have stout hearts, and have weapons and ammunition. In this 
too is the test of real leadership and manhood.67 
Although it must be accepted that, for some units surrounded in the open desert, 
with no transport on which to escape and no ammunition with which to continue 
fighting, surrender was the only option, as continued resistance to German pressure 
would   have   been   tantamount   to   suicide.   Such   tactical   justifications   of   Eighth  Army’s  
behaviour do not explain statistics of missing/surrender as high as 88 percent for the 
                                                             
66 NA WO 32/15773, The Army Council, Death Penalty in Relation to Offences Committed on Active 
Duty, 31 July 1942, p. 3. 
67 AWM 3 DRL 2632 Morshead Papers, El Alamein, 10 October 1942. 
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whole of Eighth Army, nor do they explain why the matter was of such concern to 
Auchinleck and his commanders.68  
By comparison, the German ratio of POW to total casualties during the summer 
fighting was 9 percent, that of the Italians 60 percent.69 The German ratio during 
‘Crusader’  was  69  percent  (the  British  rate  was  42  percent).70 At El Alamein, in October 
and November 1942, German surrenders can best be estimated at 40 percent of total 
casualties, while the Italians had a rate of 63 percent.71 Eighth   Army’s   high   ratio   of  
missing/surrender to total casualties is, in fact, as Morshead alludes, only comparable 
with   that  of   the   Italian   forces   that   fought  at  “Crusader”   in  November/December  1941.  
Casualty statistics   from  the  “Crusader”  battle  provided  by   the  British  Official  History  
show that Italian elements of Panzerarmee Afrika suffered a POW rate of 84 percent.72  
. . . . . . . . 
These statistics, when considered together, reinforce each other and support the 
contention that Eighth Army suffered a morale problem in the summer of 1942. A 
similar analysis of statistics also points to the reality of a dramatic turnaround in morale 
that coincided with the arrival of Montgomery in the desert. Although the exact number 
of NYD(N)/Exhaustion casualties for El Alamein is unknown, it is generally accepted 
that the incidence of breakdown during the thirteen days of fighting was remarkably 
low, especially for an attritional infantry battle.73 The monthly statistical reports on the 
health of Eighth Army for October and November 1942 stated that the incidences of 
NYD(N) were much smaller during the El Alamein offensive than they had been in 
                                                             
68 Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, Chapters One and Two. 
69 NA WO 163/51 The Army Council, Death Penalty in Relation to Offences Committed on Active Service, 
11 August 1942. 
70 Derived from statistics quoted by Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. III, p. 97. These are 
approximately the same figures the War Office received at the time, NA WO 163/51 Battle Casualties in 
Libya 18 November 1941 to 10 January 1942.  
71 Derived from statistics quoted by Bungay, Alamein, pp. 196-7. 
72 Derived from statistics quoted by Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. III, p. 97. The causes 
of Eighth Army’s  morale  crisis  are  considered  in  detail  in  Fennell,  Combat and Morale in the North African 
Campaign. 
73 Ben Shephard, A War Of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994 (London: Pimlico, 2002), p. 217; 
Harrison, Medicine and Victory, p. 123. 
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previous battles, the total number of cases for the two months combined being 209. The 
number for the July battles had been 557.74  
The 2nd New Zealand Division suffered only 57 instances of NYD(N) at El 
Alamein. This represented a ratio of 1 to 100 battle casualties, the lowest New Zealand 
ratio of the war.75  
Figure Two: 2nd New Zealand Division, NYD(N) Casualties in Relation to Battle 
Casualties, June 1942 to May 1943.76 
 
 
                                                             
74 NA WO 177/324 Monthly Statistical Report on Health of Eighth Army, October and November 1942. 
75 ANZ WAII/8/Part 2/BBB Freyberg Papers, Morale. 
76 Ibid.. 
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The statistics for NYD(N) for 1st South African Division point to a similar turnaround. 
The division suffered around 1.7 NYD(N) cases per hundred battle casualties at El 
Alamein. The rate during the summer battles was as high as 25 cases per hundred battle 
casualties.77 
The daily sick admission rate was also remarkably low. By November, the rate 
was 1.59 per thousand (a monthly rate of 47.7 per thousand), a 34 percent drop from 
2.42 in August (a monthly rate of 75 per thousand).78 Some months after El Alamein, in 
April 1943, Montgomery was able to report to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(CIGS) that the rate of admissions to hospital was as low as 0.6 per thousand (a monthly 
rate of 18 per thousand).79 
The incidence of surrender and desertion also dramatically decreased. At El 
Alamein, instances of missing/surrender made up only 17 percent of casualties. 
Allowing for the fact that El Alamein was an offensive rather than defensive operation, 
this was still a substantial reduction from the height of the crisis in the summer of 1942 
when figures were as high as 88 percent. Two days after the end of the battle, replying 
to an enquiry by the Secretary of State for War on the continuing need to consider the 
reintroduction of the death penalty, Harold Alexander, Commander-in-Chief in the 
Middle East, was able to report that the numbers of desertion or cowardice cases were 
also  decreasing  and  “I  think  they  will  continue  to  do  so.”80 
The statistics presented here clearly indicate that Eighth Army did experience a 
morale crisis in the desert, i.e. large segments of Eighth Army failed to act in the 
institutionally required fashion. Instead, considerable portions of the army acted 
contrary to what the institution wished, by deserting, surrendering, breaking down or 
going sick. The causes of this morale crisis are complex and multidimensional and have 
been dealt with elsewhere by this author.81 Nevertheless, it must be noted that the army 
that fought in the desert in the summer of 1942 was inadequately trained, poorly 
                                                             
77 NA WO 177/324 Monthly Statistical Report on Health of Eighth Army, July 1942. 
78 NA WO 177/324 Medical Diaries Deputy Director Medical Services Eighth Army, October 1941 to 
December 1942.  
79 IWM BLM 49 Montgomery to Alan Brooke, 15 April 1943. 
80 NA WO 32/15773 Alexander to P.J Grigg (Secretary of State for War), 6 November 1942. 
81 See Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign. 
 
 
JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES 
18 | P a g e  
 
equipped and averagely led; this, needless to say, had a dramatic and understandable 
effect on morale. Furthermore, it is clear that morale was revitalized leading up to the 
battle of El Alamein, and that this turnaround resulted in a marked improvement in 
Eighth  Army’s  willingness  and  determination  to  fight.  This  turnaround  was  influenced  
by an improvement in the quality of training, equipment and leadership, among other 
factors. It is testament to the soldiers of Eighth Army that, once the handicaps that they 
laboured under had been removed; they fought with determination and resilience at El 
Alamein and beyond. 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
The reality of a morale crisis and recovery in Eighth Army has implications for 
the dominant explanations of defeat and victory in North Africa. The debate on 
leadership in the desert has, more often than not, boiled down to a dialectical argument 
over who should take the credit for success at El Alamein, Montgomery or Auchinleck? 
If, as argued here, a morale crisis played a key role in determining the outcome of that 
battle, perhaps, these leaders should be assessed in light of their impact on morale. 
There were a number of critical elements of leadership that directly impinged on 
Eighth  Army’s  morale  in  1942.  These  were  clarity  of  direction,  communication  with  the  
troops,  commanders’  image,  the  handling  of  formations,  and  training. 
During the summer of 1942, an atmosphere of uncertainty surrounded Eighth 
Army’s  plans  of  operations.82 It was not clear to the troops whether Eighth Army was 
going to stand and fight at El Alamein or retreat to defensive positions under 
preparation in the Delta. The cause of this uncertainty was the widespread knowledge 
that positions in the Delta were being reconnoitred in case a retreat from the El Alamein 
line was deemed necessary.83 Recent scholarship has convincingly argued that 
Auchinleck did not intend to retreat to the Delta; in fact he was only being thorough in 
                                                             
82 NA WO 236/1 Lieut.-Gen. Sir George Erskine, HQ British Troops in Egypt, Middle East Land Forces, 5 
September 1950 to J.A.J. Agar-Hamilton,   Union   War   History   Section   of   the   Prime   Minister’s   Office,  
Pretoria; SAMAD UWH Draft Narratives, Box 364, Tobruk, Accounts from British Sources. A Provisional 
Narrative of the Fall of Tobruk, 1942 by Agar-Hamilton: General Notes and Criticisms by Lt.-Col. P.T. 
Tower, then Commander 31/58 Field Battery Royal Artillery. 
83 Hugh Mainwaring, Three Score Years and Ten with Never a Dull Moment (Printed Privately, 1976), pp. 64-
7. 
                        VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011                        
 
 
 
19 | P a g e  
 
examining all eventualities as his army retreated to El Alamein.84 The significance of 
Auchinleck’s  “plan”,  however,  was  not  whether  he  was  seriously  considering  another  
retreat,  which   he  was   not,   but   rather   the   effect   that   this   “plan”   had  on   the  morale  of  
Eighth Army.85  
Montgomery, on taking command of Eighth Army, immediately grasped the 
significance of this dynamic and issued an order that there would be no more retreat.86 
The   troops   were   informed   that   they   were   to   “burn   their   boats”   by   sending   their  
“transport  many  miles  away”  and  that  it  was  their  “duty  to  stand  and  fight”  where  they  
were  “to  the  last  man,  and  the  last  round.”87 This order, as Correlli Barnett argued quite 
correctly, was strategically meaningless; Auchinleck had not intended to retreat. But 
Barnett  overlooked  the  key  point.  He  belittled  the  “moral  impact  of  Montgomery’s  .  .  .  
‘No  retreat’  order”88 when, in fact, this order had a dramatic effect on the troops. Eighth 
Army   was   confused   and   bewildered.   The   effect   of   Montgomery’s   order,   which  
completely clarified the situation was, therefore, electric.89 The censorship summary for 
10   to  16  September  reported   that  “the  Order  of   the  Day  enjoining   the   troops   to  stand 
fast and fight on without withdrawal and surrender, definitely caught the imagination 
of   all   ranks.”90 Montgomery’s  directive   spread   like  wildfire   throughout  Eighth  Army.  
Indeed,  both  Horrocks  and  de  Guingand  described  the  effect  of  the  order  as  “magical.”91 
Providing information and controlling the perceptions of troops with little to 
dwell on other than how unfortunate they were to be holed up in the western desert, 
were key elements influencing morale. The astonishing virulence of rumours in Eighth 
                                                             
84 Barr, Pendulum of War, p. 188. 
85 J.L. Scoullar, Battle for Egypt: The Summer of 1942. Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 
1939-1945 (Wellington: War History Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, 1955), pp. 142-5. 
86 NA CAB 106/703 Address to Officers of HQ Eighth Army by General Montgomery on Taking Over 
Command of the Army, 13 August 1942. 
87 ANZ WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol. 3 MEMCWS No. XLII (26 August to 2 September 1942), p. 18. 
88 Barnett, The Desert Generals, p. 304. 
89 Mainwaring, Three Score Years and Ten with Never a Dull Moment, p. 67; AWM 54 527/6/1 Part 1, 9th 
Australian Division Report on Operations, El Alamein, 23 October to 5 November 1942, p. 2; Howard 
Kippenberger, Infantry Brigadier (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1949), p. 196. 
90 ANZ WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol. 3, MEMCWS, No. XLIV (10 to 16 September 1942), p. 2. 
91 Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 114; IWM BLM 56 Francis de Guingand to the Editor of the Sunday Times, 15 
December 1958. 
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Army and their almost universal adverse effect on morale is commented on consistently 
in the censorship summaries.92  These rumours spread widely (and wildly) because 
there was a dearth of accurate information on operations in the desert. A 50th Division 
report, on   the   “Main   Lessons   Learned”   in   the   months   of   May,   June   and   July   1942,  
pointed  out  that  the  “only  solution”  to  this  problem  was  “for  officers,  with  due  regard  
to secrecy, to give their men a picture of the general situation as they know it, at regular 
intervals.”93 
Montgomery, therefore, on taking over command, made a firm commitment to 
keep Eighth Army in the know at all times.94 This policy immediately endeared him to 
the troops and differentiated him from his predecessor. In his first memorandum on the 
coming battle of El Alamein, issued on 28 September 1942, Montgomery insisted that 
“Wed   21   October,   and   Thurs   22   October   will   be   devoted   to   the   most   intensive  
propaganda   as   regards   educating   the   attacking   troops   about   the   battle.”95 Indeed, 
Douglas Wimberley recalled how, on 21 October, he was allowed to let his 51st 
Highland  Division  know  “what  they  were  in  for,  and  their  part  in  the  battle  explained  
to  them.”96 The 9th Australian Division report on the operation stated that, during the 
two days preceding the offensive, an intensive drive was made to ensure that every 
man knew the object of the battle, the part his formation and unit had to play and the 
part that he himself had to play.97 
The  morale   report   for   August   to  October   1942   stated   that   “morale   reached   its 
peak   as   a   result   of   the  Army   Commander’s  message   to   his   troops   on   the   eve   of   the  
offensive, and of the fact (commented on widely in the mail) that all ranks, down the 
whole  chain  of  command,  were   taken   into  confidence  about   the  plan  of  attack.”98 The 
                                                             
92 AWM 54 883/2/97 MEFCWS, No. XIV (11 to 17 February 1942), p. 10. 
93 NA WO 201/538 Appendix to 50 Division Report, Main Lessons Learned since 27 May 1942, 20 July 
1942, 
94 NA CAB 106/703 Address to Officers of H.Q. Eighth Army by General Montgomery on Taking Over 
Command of the Army, 13 August 1942. 
95 IWM BLM 28/4 Lightfoot, Memorandum No. 1 by Army Commander, 28 September 1942. 
96 IWM 430 PP/MCR/182 Major-General  D.  Wimberley,  ‘Scottish  Soldier:  An  Autobiography’,  Vol.  II,  Part  
IV – World War II, p. 40. 
97 AWM 527/6/1 Part 1, 9th Australian Division Report on Operations, El Alamein, 23 October to 5 
November 1942, p. 4. 
98 NA WO 193/453 Morale Report, August to October 1942. 
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morale   report   for  November   1942   to   January   1943   stated   that   “all   ranks  were   in   the  
picture  from  the  outset;  this  evidently  made  all  the  difference.”99 
The image of each opposing commander was another factor that impacted on 
morale, particularly in light of the high standing of Rommel among the troops.100 A 
memorandum  on  the  “Morale  of  South  African  Troops”  in  the  desert,  written  in  August  
1942,  noted  that  “it  is  interesting  to  compare  the  attitude  towards  General  Rommel,  who  
has been built up by propaganda into an imposing figure, and the attitude to General 
Auchinleck, where little has been done to make his personality familiar or impressive to 
the  men.”101  
While Rommel made himself a folk hero for both sides in the desert, his British 
opponent was changed six times.102 Auchinleck twice sacked his Commander Eighth 
Army  in  the  midst  of  active  operations.  Auchinleck’s  reaction  to  this  “public  relations”  
problem  was   to   send   a   letter   to   all   Eighth  Army   commanders   on   the   subject   of   “our  
friend  Rommel”  forbidding  them  to  mention  Rommel  by  name.  “I  wish  to  dispel  by  all  
possible means [the idea] that Rommel represents something more than an ordinary 
German general. The important thing now is that we do not always talk of Rommel 
when we mean the enemy in Libya. We must refer to   ‘the   Germans’,   or   the   ‘Axis  
powers’,   or   ‘the   enemy’   and   not   always   keep   harping   on   Rommel   .   .   .   PS.   I   am   not  
jealous  of  Rommel.”103 
The key issue, as the censorship summaries show, was that Auchinleck only 
became a public figure with Eighth Army after taking over command in the field, in 
July 1942. That was exactly a year after he had assumed command in the Middle East, 
when  the  censorship  summaries  had  noted  that  “allusions  to  the  exchange  of  places  of  
General Wavell and General Auchinleck had been very rare.”104 In fact, a study of the 
censorship summaries makes it very clear that Rommel played a far more prominent 
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role   in   the   men’s   consciousness   than   did   their   own   commander,   Auchinleck.   The  
censorship summaries show that the troops had a fascination with Rommel that 
bordered  on  the  extreme.  Auchinleck’s  rise  to  prominence  in  July  1942  came  too  late  for  
Eighth Army.105 The damage had been done; Rommel was already a hero and the 
influence of the British high command on morale was undermined and outdone.  
Montgomery, on the contrary, actively pursued publicity and the press limelight 
with an energy Auchinleck had never exhibited.106 Hugh  Mainwaring,  Auchinleck’s  
GSO 1 Operations, remembered how Montgomery immediately ordered him to ensure 
that  every  man  knew  “the  name  Montgomery  by  tonight.”107 His showmanship gave 
Eighth Army a figure they could look up to, a man that could combat the image of the 
“Desert  Fox”.   
It was common practice for Eighth Army to move units from one formation to 
the next as needs arose during operations. While this allowed a certain amount of 
operational flexibility, it could at the same time prevent commanders and men from 
getting to know each other and thereby affect morale. For example, the 1st South African 
Infantry Brigade underwent ten changes in the formation to which it was attached 
during  the  “Crusader”  operations  at  the  end  of  1941.108 
The same mistakes were made six months later at Gazala, at Tobruk and on the 
El Alamein line. The 7th Medium Regiment Royal Artillery were attached to Indians, 
New Zealanders, Poles, Free French, South Africans and Australians in turn over the 
space of a few months, while battalions in the Durhams and the Guards were combined 
into composite battalions following the fall of Tobruk.109  
The  initial  court  of  enquiry  following  Tobruk  stressed  that  “Esprit  de  Corps  is  as  
important today as ever it was and this applies as much to formations as to units. 
Formations which have been trained together must operate together. To change the 
composition of Brigades or to detach them without good reason from one Division to 
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another destroys all team work, dislocates communications, upsets administration and 
has  a  bad  effect  on  the  morale  of  officers  and  men.”110 
While Auchinleck had made tentative moves to address this problem in the 
summer of 1942, Montgomery immediately put a firm end to the practice of mixing and 
matching  units.  “Divisions  would  fight  as  Divisions,”  he  said  “and  they  were  not  to  be  
split  up   into  bits  and  pieces  all  over   the  desert.”111 Following this change, Lieutenant-
General Sir Bernard Freyberg wrote home to New Zealand, in October 1942, 
emphasising   the   difference   that   it   would   make   from   “the   point   of   view   of   military  
organisation.”112 Major-General Douglas Wimberley, the commander of the 51st 
Highland Division, wrote to Montgomery in 1953 recalling that 
I do not think I could have stood for long and seen the breaking up of 
formations, (indeed already threatened the week I arrived), and the lack of 
understanding of those little psychological matters, which, nevertheless, 
with soldiers . . . make all the difference between their fighting really hard 
and their fighting more half heartedly, except of course in the imagination 
of the writers of the sit[uation] rep[ort]s, the intelligence summaries and 
the War Diaries where these things get covered up!113 
Montgomery has been described by his critics as a plodding and pedantic general.114  
Nevertheless,  his  practice  of  “stage  managing”  his  battles  and  ensuring   that  his  army  
remained   “balanced”  must   be recognised, at least in the context of North Africa, as 
policies designed in part to prevent the breaking up of units in battle and thereby 
protect  morale.  The  lessons  from  the  “Crusader”  and  summer  offensives  could  not  have  
been clearer. Troops who had been trained together needed to fight together under the 
command of leaders with whom they were used to fighting. Montgomery ensured that 
the disposition of his units was carefully prepared before any battle to avoid the 
necessity of breaking up units to deal with threats as they arose. He could, therefore, 
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ignore   Rommel’s   counter-thrusts  while   continuing  with   his   “master   plan”.   Although  
less flexible and dynamic than the German approach,115 Montgomery fought in a 
manner that made victory possible with the material that he had at hand. This firm 
grasp of what affected his troops' morale enabled him to fight a considered and realistic 
battle that he could win. 
How Auchinleck and Montgomery dealt with the level of training of the troops 
also played a fundamentally   important   role   in   affecting   Eighth  Army’s  morale.   From  
the beginning of the desert campaign to the battle of Alam Halfa, the MEF more than 
quadrupled the size of the forces at its disposal.116 Between January and August 1942 for 
instance, 149,800 reinforcements arrived in the Middle East from the UK. In addition, 
about 32,400 reinforcements came from India.117 During the same period, 2,012 tanks 
and 2,580 guns arrived in the Middle East.118 This massive influx of men and new 
equipment put a great strain on the training organisation in the desert. 
The influx of weapons from Britain and the United States meant little if the 
troops were not trained to use them.119 In the opinion of Lieutenant-General Sir William 
“Strafer”  Gott,  Commander  of  XIII  Corps,  training  demanded  time,  “and  that  time  has  
seldom been forthcoming in the Middle East. This is a point well known out here, but 
forgotten   at   home.”120 Gott   strongly   believed   that,   “unseasoned,   inexperienced   and  
poorly  trained  troops”  had  “no  place  on  any  battlefield,  but  there were some who came 
under  this  category  in  the  recent  fighting  [around  Tobruk].”121 Auchinleck believed that 
this   lack   of   training   contributed   to   a   “deterioration”   in   the   Army’s   “standard   of  
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discipline”,122 represented by the high number of desertions and surrenders in the 
desert in May, June and July 1942.  
The blame for allowing untrained units into combat does not rest entirely at the 
door of Auchinleck or Lieutenant-General Sir Neil Ritchie, his Commander Eighth 
Army. Churchill exerted enormous pressure on Auchinleck to begin operations before 
he felt he was entirely ready.123 Nevertheless,   Auchinleck’s   tactical   approach   to   the  
challenge of defeating the Panzerarmee Afrika asked much of an army that was 
inadequately trained in the use of their weapons or the skills of combined arms warfare. 
He admitted, in a letter to General Sir Alan Brooke, the CIGS, on 25 July, that perhaps 
he   had   “asked   too  much   of   [the   troops].”124 By the end of July, Auchinleck was well 
aware that his army needed significant training. He  wrote,   in  an  “Appreciation  of   the  
Situation   in   the  Western  Desert”,   on   27   July,   that   “none   of   the   formations   in   Eighth  
Army is now sufficiently trained for offensive operations. The Army badly needs either 
a reinforcement of well trained formations or a quiet  period  in  which  to  train.”125 
This was the situation that faced Montgomery on taking over command on 13 
August. Acknowledging the training deficit, just as Auchinleck did before him, 
Montgomery launched an unprecedented training regime for Eighth Army. He made it 
clear to his commanders, and through them to the men, that Eighth Army would not 
attack at El Alamein until it was ready.126 He also acknowledged the limitations of what 
could be achieved in this regard in a short period of time. He decided that he had to 
temper   what   was   “strategically   desirable”   by   what   was   “tactically   possible   with   the  
forces  at  his  disposal.”127 Montgomery, therefore, devised a strategy that catered for the 
actual situation on the ground, i.e. an under-trained citizen army, rather than the ideal 
situation of a well-trained professional army.  
Eighth Army had suffered 80,000 casualties over the summer months, and the 
“re-born  Eighth  Army  was  full  of  untrained  units.”  It  was  clear  to  Montgomery  that  he  
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had   to   “so   stage-manage the battle that my troops would be able to do what was 
demanded  of  them,  and  I  must  not  be  too  ambitious  in  my  demands.”128 This was one of 
Montgomery’s   enduring   contributions;   he  based   his  plans  on  what   the   soldiers   could  
achieve rather than what he hoped they might be able to achieve. In that way, he 
avoided  “asking  too  much”  of  his  men,  as  Auchinleck  had  done  in  July  1942.129  
. . . . . . . . . 
 It can be argued that leadership did play a crucial role in affecting morale in the 
desert and that the contributions of Montgomery and Auchinleck to success at El 
Alamein can be reconsidered by taking this into account. The relevance of materiel to 
victory can also be reappraised in this light. 
There is no dispute over the fact that Eighth Army significantly outnumbered the 
Panzerarmee Afrika in terms of men and materiel during the critical months of fighting 
that led to victory at El Alamein in November 1942. The Panzerarmee’s quantitative 
inferiority was exacerbated by the fact that its supply system was compromised by 
distance, and, perhaps more importantly, by Ultra. The logistical problems facing the 
Panzerarmee, as Martin Kitchen has described, were almost insurmountable. Between 
January and August 1942 the Panzerarmee had to make do with only 40 percent of the 
supplies it needed.130 Such circumstances have prompted Kitchen, echoing 
Warlimont,131 to   describe   El   Alamein   as   a   battle   of   “materiel,   in   which   tactical skill, 
courage and morale were no longer significant. It was a war that the Axis could not 
possibly  win.”132 
The suggestion that the outcome of the battle of El Alamein was determined by 
Eighth   Army’s   materiel   superiority   can   certainly   be   challenged.   Eighth Army had 
enjoyed considerable numerical and materiel advantages before, at Gazala and during 
the July battles, and had been beaten. Recent scholarship has also provided evidence to 
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suggest that there is a weak correlation between materiel advantages and success in 
war.133 The best equipped military machine will have little success if an army is 
unwilling to fight. The evidence from the desert, without a doubt, suggests that materiel 
was important, but, not solely in the manner that Warlimont and Kitchen imply. In fact, 
it can be argued that a vitally important impact of materiel during the desert war was 
the affect that it had on the morale of the troops.  
In July 1942, following Gazala and the fall of Tobruk, an inquiry was undertaken 
by officers of Eighth Army and by officers flown out from the United Kingdom. It was 
found   that   troops’  perceptions  of   the  quality  of   their  weapons  played  a  major   role   in  
influencing morale.134 Significantly, the report recommended that the capabilities of 
forces arrayed against each other in the desert should not be calculated by numbers of 
tanks  and  guns  alone.  Instead,  it  advised  that  “the  fighting  capacity  of  formations  and  
units  must  be  measured  .  .  .  also  by  their  morale  and  the  state  of  their  equipment.”135 
A study carried out in 1943 on the reasons why soldiers disliked particular 
weapons gives further insight into this relationship between morale and materiel in 
battle.   The   report   pointed   to   a   “notable   demoralising   effect”   when   troops   compared  
their own weapons disadvantageously   with   those   of   the   enemy.   “The   feeling   of  
inequality – almost   of   injustice”,   the   report   concluded,   “appears   to   be   very  
important.”136 The morale crisis that began to rear its head in the summer of 1942 can to 
some extent be attributed to this dynamic. Indeed Mark Johnston and Peter Stanley 
have  blamed  “a  loss  of  faith  in  equipment”  as  one  of  the  key  reasons  for  the  crisis  in  the  
desert in 1942.137 
Montgomery’s   assumption   of   command   of   Eighth   Army   coincided   with   the  
arrival of new, but also better quality, weapons from the UK and USA. Nevertheless, he 
saw the increasing material strength of Eighth Army not as a battle-winning element on 
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its own, but as one of the key factors that would motivate his troops to withstand the 
“hard  and  prolonged  fighting”  that he predicted at El Alamein. He believed that arms 
and weapons were but a mechanical extension of the pride and aggressive attributes of 
the individual. Without pride and confidence in them the soldier was unlikely to have 
confidence in himself and his ability to fight.138  
The censorship summaries show that the influx of weapons played a major role 
in reinvigorating morale before El Alamein. By the end of September, the summaries 
reported  that  “mail  from  8th Army personnel made pleasant reading; the esprit de corps 
is  amazingly  high   .   .   .  To  get   ‘on   the   job  again’  appears   to  be   the  earnest  desire  of  all  
troops who are confident that we are stronger and better equipped than at any time, 
and that morale cannot be   improved   by   too   much   waiting.”139 By October, the 
summaries   reported   that   “there   is   no  doubt   [that]   the  most   satisfactory   feature  of   the  
mail was the confidence that [Eighth Army] can now face the Germans with parity in 
weapons.”140 
In general, the armies that fought in the desert experienced defeat on the 
battlefield when they could no longer continue fighting, either because their material 
strength was insufficient, or, because they lost the will to continue fighting. There was, 
therefore, either a loss of the material capability to keep fighting or a loss of the will to 
keep fighting, or both.  
Clausewitz   argued   that   “every   engagement   is   a   bloody   and   destructive   test   of  
physical and moral strength. Whoever has the greater sum of both left at the end is the 
victor.”  Nevertheless,  Clausewitz  was   in   no   doubt   that,  more   often   than   not,   “in   the  
engagement,   the   loss  of  morale   has  proved   the  major   decisive   factor,”141 a contention 
that Niall Ferguson has convincingly maintained for warfare in the twentieth century.142 
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Eighth   Army’s   superiority   in   numbers   and   firepower   at   El   Alamein   had   a  
devastating effect on the morale of the troops of the Panzerarmee as well as on their 
material capability to fight.143 Montgomery   had   written,   as   early   as   1940,   that   “the  
concentrated fire of artillery and mortars is a battle-winning factor of the first 
importance. By means of it the enemy troops can be shaken and their morale 
lowered.”144 The lessons from operations derived from the battle of El Alamein backs up 
this assertion. It was acknowledged   that   “several   formations   .   .   .   reported   that  
considering the density of the artillery support during the various attacks, the number 
of enemy dead and wounded found by the leading troops was surprisingly light, and 
that enemy automatic weapons quickly opened up when the barrage or concentration . . 
.   passed.”   The   report   stressed   that   the   killing   power   of   artillery   barrages   or  
concentrations against well dug in infantry is often slight. The purpose of the artillery 
support  in  an  attack  “is  primarily to  shake  the  enemy’s  morale,  temporarily  to  stupefy  
him . . . to enable the attacker to reach the objective with the minimum of casualties. The 
killing  or  capture  of  the  enemy  then  follows.”145 Reports and accounts written later and 
after the war tended to lend support to this conclusion.146 One such report found that 
the morale effects of bombardments were anywhere between two to six times greater 
than the material effects.147  
By the closing stages of El Alamein the German war diaries reported that their 
troops   were   “exhausted’   and   that,   taking   all   things   into   consideration,   “it   had   to   be  
admitted that after a desperate 10-day struggle against an enemy superior on land and 
in the air the Army was in no condition to prevent a further attempt at breaking 
through.”148 The war diaries identified four reasons why further resistance would fail. 
The   first  was   “the   enemy’s   great   superiority   in   tanks   and   artillery.”  However   Eighth  
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Army’s  armoured  units  had  proved  largely  ineffective  at  El  Alamein  and  it  is  arguable  
that the artillery did more morale than material damage to the Axis forces.149 The 
second  reason  was  “the  continual  heavy  day  and  night  bombing  attacks,  against  which  
there  was  no  defence”  and  which  “only  added  to  the  feeling  of  inferiority”  suffered  by  
the troops of the Panzerarmee. However, air bombardment was notoriously inaccurate150 
and was seen by both sides largely as a morale weapon rather than a material one.151 
The  third  reason  was  the  “almost  complete  failure  of  the  Italian  troops.”  According  to  
the report of the GOC Afrika Korps, the Axis problem lay once again with the morale of 
the Italian formations. The fourth and final reason was the Panzerarmee’s “own  heavy  
losses   in   men   and   materiel   on   account   of   the   enemy’s   vast   superiority   in   the   most  
modern weapons.”   There   can   be   no   doubt   that   the   weight   of   fire   unleashed   on   the  
Panzerarmee caused destruction and casualties. However, this arguably was not the 
primary drain on the Panzerarmee’s material and manpower resources. In fact, a large 
proportion of these casualties can be attributed to morale rather than material causes. 
The statistics show that 40 percent of German and 63 percent of Italian casualties were 
missing or POW; the rate for British and Commonwealth troops during the battle was 
17 percent.152 In addition, extremely high sickness rates, a sure sign of morale problems, 
removed large numbers of men from the front line.153 Mark Harrison has estimated that 
nearly one in five Germans were listed as sick during the battle, with the elite 15th 
Panzer Division suffering a sickness rate as high as 38 percent.154 Problems with 
desertion and surrender had prompted Rommel to encourage use of the death penalty 
at courts marshal during July;155 these problems persisted into October and 
November.156 Finally, one of the greatest effects of heavy losses of any kind is the impact 
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that they have on primary group cohesion, which is generally recognised as a key factor 
in maintaining morale on the front line.157 
By  the  end  of  the  battle  of  El  Alamein  Eighth  Army  also  had  “virtually  run out of 
formed   infantry   units   that   could   still   be   used   in   the   attack.”158 Many of the front line 
battalions of Eighth Army suffered over 50 percent casualties;159 these were 
Montgomery’s   main   offensive   force.   However,   in   comparison   to   the   Panzerarmee, 
incidences of sickness, surrender and desertion were extremely low. Eighth Army won 
the   “killing   match”   that   Montgomery   predicted   at   El   Alamein   due   to   sheer  
determination and will power as much as any other factor. The arrival of large amounts 
of new and better weapons played a decisive role in developing this determination 
among the troops.  
. . . . . . . . . . 
To conclude, this paper has attempted to offer a perspective on the North African 
Campaign that differentiates itself from the existing historiography in three ways. 
Firstly  it  has  been  based  on  new  sources,  the  censorship  summaries  of  the  soldiers’  mail.  
Secondly, it has incorporated a novel methodology, by integrating a quantitative 
analysis of the many indicators and corollaries of morale with a qualitative 
investigation of the other available primary sources. Thirdly, it has reinterpreted some 
of the existing historiography on the conflict, by highlighting the morale crisis and 
turnaround that coincided with defeat and victory and by reassessing the roles played 
by leadership and materiel in the outcome of the battle of El Alamein. It is suggested 
that the turnaround in morale was central to the success at El Alamein and that the 
impact of both leadership and materiel on that victory can best be understood in this 
light. 
 
                                                             
157 For a critique of the literature on primary group cohesion and the role played by the primary group in 
maintaining  Eighth  Army’s  morale  in  the  desert  please  see  Fennell,  Combat and Morale in the North African 
Campaign, Chapter Eight. 
158 Barr, Pendulum of War, p. 397. 
159 Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, pp. 252-7. 
